In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.

The citizen-debate approach, proposed to study the performance of representative democracies, builds on a multi-stage game where the same agents are asked whether or not to become a candidate and, successively, to vote. Consistently, the solution concept adopted in Besley and Coate (1997)...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium, if the electorate is large. Moreover, we show that there is an effect of sincere voters'...

In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e., with two or more candidates elected with positive probability), is regular and hence, a Mertens' stable set.

In this paper we show that in a simple spacital model where the government is chosen under strict proportional rule, if The outcome function is a linear combination of parties' positions, with coefficients equal to their share of seats, only a two-party voting equilibrium basically exists. The...

In this paper we show, via some simple examples, that also in the class of games we are dealing with, there are perfect equilibria that are not proper and, moreover, some "proper" outcome is not induced by any stable set. Furthermore, we xhow that the perfect concept does not appear restrictive...

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly plurality voting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active...

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.