Lindelauf et al. (2009a) introduced a quantitative approach to investigate optimal structures of covert networks. This approach used an objective function which is based on the secrecy versus information trade-off these organizations face. Sageman (2008) hypothesized that covert networks...

Consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions precludes transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to...

One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the payoffs of a matching can be divided between the agents. We take a similar approach to...

This paper reports the results from a multi-attribute market negotiation experiment to study how the structure of the negotiation process influences its efficiency. We found that, conditional on the success of the negotiation, the total value created increased with the time spent negotiating; by...

We fully identify the class of social choice functions that are implementable in von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable set (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) by a rights structure. A rights structure formalizes the idea of power distribution in a society. Following Harsanyi’critique (Harsanyi,...

The supervisory board of Porsche SE, after a successful takeover of Volkswagen AG, was supposed to consist of three groups: The Porsche shareholders would have been endowed with 6 seats, while the 324,000 Volkswagen employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees would have been represented by 3...