Sequential advice to a decision maker by two experts, if kept secret from the public, outperforms transparent deliberations. Under secrecy, the prior bias together with the bias due to the lead expert's opinion may or may not generate a conformity bias effect. These effects determine if and when...

We introduce a framework to examine, both theoretically and empirically, electoral maldistricting. Maldistricting is defined as districting in pursuit of a policy at the expense of social welfare. Analysis is performed on the set of implementable (via some district map) legislatures, which are...

Studies of strategic sophistication in experimental normal form games commonly assume that subjects' beliefs are consistent with independent choice. This paper examines whether beliefs are consistent with correlated choice. Players play a sequence of simple 2×2 normal form games with distinct...

Under uncertainty, subjects in laboratory experiments often violate Savages Sure Thing Principle (Postulate 2). These violations are implied by inconsistencies between a pair of choices. We perform an indirect test with a single choice. The test is based on our result that in a simple...

In this paper we study delegated portfolio management when the manager's ability to short-sell is restricted. Contrary to previous results, we show that under moral hazard, linear performance-adjusted contracts do provide portfolio managers with incentives to gather information. We find that the...