We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific...

In this paper, we analyse if individual inequality aversion measured with simple experimental games depends on whether the monetary endowment in these games is either a windfall gain (“house money”) or a reward for a certain effort-related performance. Moreover, we analyse whether the way of...

This paper explores the question whether boundedly rational agents learn to behave optimally when asked to voluntarily contribute to a public good. The decision process of individuals is described by an Evolutionary Algorithm. We analyze the learning process of purely and impurely altruistic...

Dieser Beitrag bietet eine Einführung in eine Gruppe moderner Algorithmen, den sogenannten evolutionären Optimierungsverfahren. Anhand eines einfachen Beispiels wird die grundsätzliche Funktionsweise dieser Algorithmen skizziert. Darüberhinaus wird ein Überblick über die...