Countries' capital account policies might be contagious in the sense that domestic policies are driven by other countries' policies. A model of strategic interactions is developed to show that countries' best response to policy changes elsewhere consists in imitating this policy. Using a spatial...

A theoretical model is adopted in order to explain incentives and actual safety behaviour for drivers, pedestrians and other road users which do not utilise motorised vehicles. A road user's outcome is supposed to be dependent on her individual actions and cares decided upon by other individuals...

In this paper, we explore empirically whether the USDA Forest Service's litigation success rate in each Forest Service region helps explain the persistent regional effects noted by Laband et al. (Laband, D.N., González-Cabán, A., and Hussain, A. (2006). “Factors That Influence...

In this paper we investigate how observable cognitive skills influence the development of strategic sophistication. To answer this question, we study experimentally how psychometric measures of theory-of-mind and cognitive ability (or 'fluid intelligence') work together with age to determine the...

Recently the software industry has experienced fundamental changes in market structure through the entry of open source competitors, e.g. Linux's entry into the operating systems market. In a simple model we examine the effects of such a change in market structure from monopoly to duopoly under...

On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour. Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis, strategic reasoning and strategy construction...

This paper examines the behaviour of two firms competing in a duopoly, where firms can influence demand through use of advertising. The paper simulates the strategic interaction of the two firms based on a game-theoretic Cournot analytical model. The evolution over time of the Nash equilibrium...

We consider a market economy where two rational agents are able to learn the distribution of future events. In this context, we study whether moving away from the standard Bayesian belief updating, in the sense of under-reaction to some degree to new information, may be strategically convenient...

We study strategic interaction in an experimental social-preferences vacuum chamber. We mute social preferences by letting participants knowingly interact with computers. Our new design allows for indirect strategic interaction: there are several waves in which computer players inherit the...

In this paper we study the delegation of monetary policy to independent central bankers in a two country world with monetary spill-overs. The paper shows that under imperfect commitment and private information of the Central Bankers about their objectives the optimal degree of commitment depends...