This article gives a brief and informal introduction to the theory of judgment aggregation and to the discursive dilemma, focusing on methodology and interpretation.

Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set.

Majority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue...

Collective contests are examined permitting heterogeneity of stakes within every competing group. Our first concern is whether unequal distribution of stakes in a group can enhance its win probability. Our second concern is whether a large stake in a group can be individually disadvantageous. We...

A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on...

The characteristics of endogenously determined sharing rules and the group-size paradox are studied in a model of group contest with the following features: (i) The prize has mixed private-public good characteristics. (ii) Groups can differ in marginal cost of effort and their membership size....

We propose a simple non-cooperative game model where two fragmented teams compete to increase their performance. The theoretical framework is based on the theory of conflict. We show that depending on the value of a parameter in the model, the power of the competing teams may be expressed as a...

Influencing and being influenced by others is the very essence of human behaviour. We put forward an exploratory asset-pricing model allowing for social influence on investor judgments under ambiguity. The time series of returns generated by our model displays volatility clustering, a puzzling...

In light of research indicating that individual behavior may violate standard assumptions of rationality, we modify the standard model of preference aggregation to study the case in which neither individual nor collective preferences are required to satisfy transitivity or other coherence...

The literature has focused on a particular way of aggregating judgments: Given a set of yes or no questions or issues, the individuals’ judgments are then aggregated separately, issue by issue. Applied in this way, the majority method does not guarantee the logical consistency of the set of...