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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730970
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109597
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Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Morris, Stephen; Mailath, George J - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051332
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Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928
signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if it induces a “regular” 2×2 coordination game in the continuation play …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043043
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The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs
Miyagawa, Eiichi; Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2004
This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385284
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Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version
McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2005
coordination device. A player.s informational size associated with the public coordination device is the key to inducing truth … coordination device if she believes that her signal is likely to have a small impact on the public signal generated by the public … equilibrium in nearby private monitoring repeated games when the associated public coordination device, which makes private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293082