Исследована модель многошаговых инсайдерских торгов рисковыми активами одного типа между двумя маркет-мейкерами на фондовом рынке. Один из игроков (инсайдер)...

The Kreps—Wilson—Milgrom—Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modelling reputation—building. Once the number of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal length of a relationship. We...

We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The...

The famous theorem of R. Aumann and M. Maschler states that the sequence of values of an <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$N$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>N</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-stage zero-sum game <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varGamma _N(\rho )$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <msub> <mi mathvariant="italic">Γ</mi> <mi>N</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo stretchy="false">(</mo> <mi mathvariant="italic">ρ</mi> <mo stretchy="false">)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> with incomplete information on one side and prior distribution <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\rho $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ρ</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> converges as <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$N\rightarrow \infty $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>N</mi>...</mrow></math></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of "unused...