-mover advantage, so that both firms are active beyond some level of market development. Once both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion …, taking the form of postponed capacity investment, may occur in Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Volatility and the expected speed …We study the development of a duopoly industry -evolution of firm capacities and competitive behavior- in a continuous …

both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion, taking the form of postponed capacity investment, may occur as a MPE. Volatility …We study the development of a duopoly in a continuous-time model of capacity investment under no commitment by firms … tacit collusion equilibria is favored by higher demand volatility, faster market growth, as well as by lower discount rate …

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition in a …, nous étudions un modèle (duopole) de préemption avec investissements multiples et concurrence instantanée à la Bertrand … the average growth rate of the market is close to the risk free rate, or if the volatility of demand changes is high, the …

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and … Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments …-delay tacit collusion. …

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity … preemption pattern, and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously, a tacit collusion pattern. These episodes may alternate … therefore be riskier than socially optimal. When both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion episodes may be MPE-compatible: firms …

market growth rate and volatility affect the extent of the distortion. If the initial market demand is high, greater … volatility increases the effective investment cost and results in lower value for both firms. Vertical restraints can restore … input. Otherwise, if two downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells the input to the first …

development uncertainty and may enter by investing in lumpy capacity units. With perfect mobility, when the first entrant plays as … a Stackelberg leader a Markov perfect preemption equilibrium obtains in which the leader invests earlier, and the … dissipation, and no equalization, in a constrained preemption equilibrium. The first-mover advantage on the product market then …

We study a simple duopoly model of preemption with multiple investments and instantaneous Bertrand competition on a … volatility of demand shocks is high, no dissipation of rents occur in equilibrium, despite instantaneous Bertrand competition. If …

We model capacity-building investments in a homogeneous product duopoly facing uncertain demand growth. Capacity … preemption pattern, and episodes in which firms invest simultaneously, a tacit collusion pattern. These episodes may alternate … therefore be riskier than socially optimal. When both firms hold capacity, tacit collusion episodes may be MPE-compatible: firms …

the model to allow for downstream duopoly. When downstream firms are engaged in a preemption race, the upstream firm sells … investment option, greater volatility can result in a lower value for both firms. We examine several contractual alternatives to …