This paper extends research in dynamic traffic modeling using METROPOLIS, a dynamic simulation tool. We briefly present an overview of the original departure time choice model introduces by W. Vickrey (1969) for a single O-D pair. Using this framework for our analysis, we explore how the...

We show that optimal delegated portfolio management contracts-which serve to screen out uninformed agents and reward potentially informed agents sufficiently to compensate their opportunity and/or effort costs-need not imply churning, or randomised trading if uninformed, by the able screened...

In this paper we propose a theory of individual moral consistency and we examine some consequences of this theory in particular contexts. Our notion of individual moral consistency is interpreted as a means for 'laundering' individula objectives that are amalgamated into collective judgements by...

Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

We analyze the joint convergence of sequences of discounted stock prices and the Radon-Nicodym derivatives of the minimal martingale measure when interest rates are stochastic. Therefrom we deduce the convergence of option values in either complete or incomplete markets. We particularize the...

In a 2-person Nash equilibrium any pure strategy is evaluated against the same mixed strategy of the opponent. The equilibrium condition says that all pure strategies used at equilibrium are best replies, hence they give the same payoff. We keep here the last two requirements (best reply and...

L'auteur etudie un probleme de revelation des priferences pour la qualite d'un service public avec exclusion et de controle de cette qualite dans le cadre d'une relation principal-agent. Le principal ne connait pas les preferences des usagers en matiere de qualite. Par ailleurs, il ne peut...

Cet article etudie le marche de l'assurance quant les compagnies sont mieux informees que l'agent du risque qu'il court.