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Decentralization and Collusion.
Baliga, S.; Sjostrom, T. - Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), … - 1996
We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245587
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Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction.
Battigalli, P.; Siniscalchi, M. - Department of Economics, European University Institute - 1999
The authors provide an epistemic analysis of forward induction in games with complete and incomplete information. They …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005816407
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A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information.
Bassan, B.; Gossner, O.; Scarsini, M.; Zamir, S. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1999
It is well known that, whereas in one-agent contexts the value of information is always positive, in strategic … situations, this is not always the case. We will consider the class of games for which, under a specific information structure … information structure is Pareto dominated by this unique Pareto payoff profile. Therefore for these games the value of information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775617
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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games.
Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996
The paper discusses several topics such Nash equilibria, repeated games. It also discusses applications to market games, regulation and R&D games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775632
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Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games.
Battigalli, P. - Department of Economics, European University Institute - 1999
incomplete information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005744343
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Research, Development, and Information Sharing.
Sasaki, D. - Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Economics - 1999
the fiels of industrial economics. This chapter is devoted to the strategic role of information in oligopoly, and more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005750767
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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations.
Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996
We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618870
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Bluff and Reputation.
Sorin, S. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996
This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The … use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618884
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An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection.
Ania, A.B.; Troger, T.; Wambach, A. - Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis - 1998
Since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the problem of non-existence of equilibrium hat puzzled many economists. In this paper we approach this problem from an evolutionary point of view. In a dynamic model insurance companies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646685
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Cheap Talking in Games with Incomplete Information.
Ben-Porath, E. - Foerder Institute for Economic Research, Eitan Berglas … - 2000
The paper studies Bayesian Games which are extended by adding pre-play communication. Let T be a Bayesian game with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005647277