In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule...

We consider a discrete-time two-sector Cobb-Douglas economy with positive sector specific external effects. We show that indetermincay of steady states and cycles can easily arise with constant or decreasing social returns to scale, and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast...

This paper analytically investigates the incentive scheme of perpetrators of violent conflicts. It provides a rational equilibrium framework to elicit how monetary incentives and survival considerations shape a combatant’s decision to participate in a conflict. In the model, a leader decides...

Au total, il semble bien que nous puissions conclure qu’à l’échelle nationale la mise en place de la loi Scellier a entraîné une hausse des prix du prix du mètre carré de l’ordre de 3 euros la première année et de 6 euros sur 2009 et 2010. Si l’on raisonne en termes de taux de...

This paper addresses the impact of violent conflict on social capital, as measured by citizen anticipation in community groups defined for four activity types: governance, social service, infrastructure development and risk-sharing. Combining household panel data from Indonesia with conflict...

This paper fully investigates how a tax rate change can affect tax evasion, under the expected utility theory hypothesis. We generalize the Allingham-Sandmo benchmark model of tax evasion, using very general non-linear specifications for the tax schedule and the fine scheme. We consider both...

This paper provides a way to detect customer-based discrimination in the housing market using survey data. We build a matching model with ethnic externalities where landlords differ in the number of housing units they own within the same neighborhood. In the event of customers’ prejudice...

This paper examines the effect of moral hazard on public health insurance contract. It models primary prevention in a two period model with classification risk. Agent’s preferences appear to play an important role in the optimal determination of preventive effort and insurance between...

Axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Nash’s theorem) is static. We attempt to provide a dynamic justification for the theory. Suppose a Judge or Arbitrator must allocate utility in a (infinite) sequence of two-person problems; at each date, the Judge is presented with a utility possibility set...