A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is modeled in this paper.

This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

The paper provides a general analysis of the types of models with E-Perturbations which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. Two new measures of the size and structure of the basins of attraction of dynamic systems, the radius and coradius, are introduced in...

A cornerstone of game theory is backward induction, whereby players reason backward from the end of a game in extensive form to the beginning in order to determine what choices are rational at each stage of play. Truels, or three-person duels, are used to illustrate how the outcome can depend on...

The possibility of cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma without memory is investigated in an evolutionary framework where 1) some agents ('Vulcans') are morally commited to cooperation, 2) some others ('Klingons') are not commited at all, and 3) there is random matching.