For a steady state to be a Nash equilibrium the agents have to perfectly observe the actions of others. This paper suggests a solution concept for cases where players observe only an imperfect signal of what the others' actions are. The model is enriched by specifying the signal that each player...

Let Gamma be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Gamma ^infinity (delta) and G^infinity (delta) be the infinitely repeated game version of Gamma and G respectively, with common discount factor delta. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of...

The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from <i>sets</i> of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a <i>list</i>. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice...

A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to take a certain action. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, depend on the state of the world, which is known only to the speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements from which the...

We suggest a concept of convexity of preferences that does not rely on any algebraic structure. A decision maker has in mind a set of orderings interpreted as evaluation criteria. A preference relation is defined to be convex when it satisfies the following condition: If, for each criterion,...

Ariel Rubinstein gives his answer to Freakonomics.

The standard economic choice model assumes that the decision maker chooses from <i>sets</i> of alternatives. In contrast, we analyze a choice model in which the decision maker encounters the alternatives in the form of a <i>list</i>. We present two axioms similar in nature to the classical axioms of choice...

A set of lecture notes for the first quarter of a graduate microeconomics class, based on classes taught by the author at Tel Aviv, Princeton, and New York Universities.