A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what … evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution …

A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what … evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution …

A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what … evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer … seller, the buyer presents evidence to support his previous assertions, and then the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer … discriminate on the basis of the buyer's evidence. …

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value … mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third degree price discrimination--independently of non-evidence … characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence …

serves as a substitute for commitment, enabling the central bank to achieve the efficient Ramsey equilibrium and avoid the … inefficient, time-inconsistent one-shot Nash equilibrium. We find that reputation is a poor substitute for commitment. We then … better mitigated by a commitment regime than by any discretionary policy. Thus, we find that there is no trade-off between …