This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the...

The paper considers public funding of political parties when some voters are poorly informed about parties? candidates and campaigns are informative. For symmetric equilibria, it is shown that more public funding leads parties to chose more moderate candidates, and that an increase in the...

Price discrimination and rationing of low price customers can often be observed (viz. flight and theater tickets, sales of branded goods). We construct a monopoly model to explain this phenomenon. A firm has the option to charge a high price on a 'day 1', and a low price on a 'day 2', and ration...

In a general equilibrium macro model with wage bargaining, agents are divided into capitalists and workers. The markets for produced goods and money are competitive, but the wage rate is determined by negotiation between an employers' union and a trade union. Unions are supposed to be "long...

Migration gives rise to an externality across districts that issue local public debt. Unless taxation is entirely in the form of property taxes, local debt is not fully capitalized in property values (even with a competitive land market) and each district over-accumulates debt. A common debt...

This paper considers political competition and the consequences of political polarization when parties are better informed about how the economy functions than voters are. Specifically, parties know the cost of producing a public good, voters do not. An incumbent's choice of policy acts like a...

An infinitely repeated monetary policy game … la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently...

The paper investigates strategic campaigning in a model of redistributive politics in a society with many groups and two parties. Campaigns are informative, and parties can target campaigns to different groups. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favor special groups. The parties will...

This paper investigates the merits of different democratic institutions when politics is uni-dimensional, there is uncertainty both about the preferences of the future electorate and the future polarization of political parties, and politicians have better information about the state of the...

In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in...