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Tournaments are widely used to assign bonuses and determine promotions because of the link between relative performance and rewards. However, performing relatively well (poorly) may also yield psychological benefits (pain). This may also stimulate effort. Through a real-effort artefactual field...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420737
differences in betting odds or rankings to measure ability differences, our results support standard tournament theory as we find …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333912
assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333966
We study theoretically and experimentally the role of fatigue and recovery within a competitive work environment. At work, agents usually make their effort choice in response to competition and monetary incentives. At the same time, they have to take into account fatigue, which accumulates over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985278
If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents\' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932925
This paper tests two hypotheses from the theory of elimination tournaments: (i) that uneven tournaments, where the contestants are ex ante heterogeneous, entail lower effort exertion; this is a prediction from agency theory that has not been tested empirically before; and (ii) whether incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261647
Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262080
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263109
When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263840
. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611