unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of … valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989.) When … the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly …

unique distribution. In this paper we study the optimal auction problem allowing for ambiguity about the distribution of … valuations. Agents may be ambiguity averse (modeled using the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989.) When … the bidders face more ambiguity than the seller we show that (i) given any auction, the seller can always (weakly …

Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to … uncertainty a bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given her bid is an …

ambiguity about the distribution from which these valuations are drawn and where the seller or the bidder may display ambiguity … aversion. We model ambiguity aversion using the maxmin expected utility model where an agent evaluates an action on the basis … the case where the bidders are ambiguity averse (and the seller is ambiguity neutral). Our first result shows that the …

Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to … uncertainty a bidder will expect to face the distribution of valuations that minimizes her expected utility, given her bid is an …

The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We … analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only …

This paper considers the question of tacit collusion in repeated auctions with independent private values. McAfee and …

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of supply uncertainty on the formation of prices and on the seller …'s expected revenue in sequential first- and second-price sealed bid auctions. …