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This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. We introduce two different bargaining mechanisms: tacit and explicit bargaining. In tacit bargaining, an uninformed principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906690
We often use delegation as a commitment device if a government faces problems of timeinconsistency. McCallum (1995, AER … P&P) challenged this practice, claiming that delegation merely relocates the commitment problem but does not solve it …. In a model where delegation and specific policies are subject to the same commitment technology it is shown that McCallum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200597
, and the relationship between the resources. Monitoring is then introduced to fine tune value of delegation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785789
This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker’s objective. The optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785919
for each task is given to the party with necessary human capital, and hierarchical delegation where the decision authority …. Hierarchical delegation is optimal in the intermediate case. We also discuss the optimal pattern of hierarchical delegation as well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005786967
) increases with the length of time since the last decision was made. The model shows delegation is more likely as: (i … predictions are consistent with our novel empirical results on the delegation of major organizational change decisions using … internal and external factors highlighted as potentially important in our theory. Empirically, delegation is more likely in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004967980
We analyze a model in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to be made by simple monotonic decision rules. Then we look for optimal rules in several contexts. A trade-off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968135
. We illustrate that delegation is useful for several reasons. First, it serves to test agents with unknown ability. Then …, it may improve their motivation when carrying out decisions. Moreover, delegation to subordinates may be useful to limit … the power of middle managers. Costs of delegation arise due to the risk of having lower quality decisions and because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968181
conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We … consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968390
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is … with delegation, is valuable for the principal if she retains control over the second decision. Hence, this paper provides … a new rational for partial delegation: a transfer of control to the better-informed party can be used by the supervisor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968420