Most models of labor markets and (un)employment neglect how competition among firms or sectors of the economy affects their hiring of workers and working times. Our approach pays special attention to such effects by proposing a complex stage game where firms invest in capital equipment before...

We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture....

Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union's power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two...

In seiner Besprechung der 1. Auflage dieser umfangreichen Einführung in die nicht-kooperative Spieltheorie lobte Martin A. Lobeck das anschauliche Beispielmaterial und schrieb: "Die Autoren, alle Volkswirtschaftler, legen den Schwerpunkt auf die ökonomischen Anwendungen der Spieltheorie und...