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We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559
In this paper we investigate four hypotheses which are inconsistent with expected utility theory, but may well be explained by prospect theory. It deals with framing, the non-linearity of subjective probabilities, the disposition effect, and the correspondence of different experimental risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613618
We investigate (i) whether traders on an experimental asset market form different and separate mental accounts for sale revenues and for dividend earnings and whether (ii) an increase in tax penalty or (iii) an increase in audit frequency increases tax compliance. The results indicate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613619
laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383054
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
laboratory experiment, we compare the effects of bidders' limited liability in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130292
. Additionally, the experiment assesses the effect of group decision making. A Nash equilibrium prediction for individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130516
In an experiment using two-bidder first-price sealed bid auctions with symmetric independent private values, we scan …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134493
We study, theoretically and experimentally, sealed-bid first-price auctions with and without package bidding. In the model, a global bidder bids for multiple items and can benefit from synergies, while local bidders bid for a single item. In the equilibrium, package bidding improves (hurts)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115730
This paper considers the sealed bid and ascending auction, which both identifies the minimum Walrasian equilibrium prices and where truthful preference revelation constitutes an equilibrium. Even though these auction formats share many theortical properties, there are behavioral aspects that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120118