This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in...

Higher electoral competition reinforces the position of special interest groups, which can endorse politicians in exchange for the support of specific policies. This paper formalizes this intuition and test it on Italian electoral data, using the 1991 electoral reform as an exogenous source of...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private domestic or foreign firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp...

In this paper, we present a model of endogenous vertical integration and horizontal differentiation. Thereexists two output brands and two versions of the input. The only mean for output differentiation is the inputversion used in output production. Firms may choose to vertically integrate to...

We propose a new dynamic model for volatility and dependence in high dimensions, that allows for departuresfrom the normal distribution, both in the marginals and in the dependence. The dependence is modeled with adynamic canonical vine copula, which can be decomposed into a cascade of bivariate...

In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, howcollaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences thepossible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form. The all pay auctionapproach allows us to...

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms’ organizational structure, andconsumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-basedprofit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve...

We define a two-variant model of product differentiation which, depending on the number of consumersprefering one variant to the other, provides equilibrium prices reflecting the natural valuation of thesevariants by the market....

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, orcapacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” in order tohelp the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to...