We show that a lender often experiences increasing marginal returns to screening in a standard setting where the lender decides how intensively to screen the projects of prospective borrowers. The increasing marginal returns imply that even small changes in industry parameters can produce large...

This paper considers a simple moral hazard setting in which a project owner (or, more generally, a principal) hires a contractor (or, more generally, an agent) to operate her project. We show that a systematic increase in the agent's operating costs can increase either the principal's profit or...

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions...

The literature on intra-industry trade and strategic trade policy has always considered only profit-maximizing private firms being active in international trade. This paper incorporates state-owned public firms in the context of intra-industry trade. The existence of welfare-maximizing public...

Recent work suggest that Cournot oligopolists competing in a spatial model, with uniform distribution of consumers, agglomerate at the center of the market. This paper analyzes the robustness of this result with a general symmetric distribution of consumers.