We study how best to reward innovators whose work builds on earlier innovations. Incentives to innovate are obtained by offering innovators the opportunity to profit from their innovations. Since innovations compete, awarding rights to one innovator reduces the value of the rights to prior...

I introduce a Bayesian-learning model of the firm to account for a variety of empirical facts about firms. The many tasks the firm can undertake (the scope of the firm) are informationally related, so that the firm can enjoy some economies of scope from information. The model predicts changes in...

This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation where firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. The optimal assignment of property rights must...

When innovations are heterogeneous, it may be advantageous to provide a variety of patents. By trading off patent breadth for length, it is possible that fees are not needed in the optimal policy. We present two examples. The first is a quality-ladder model, in which innovations benefit society...

Patents are a useful but imperfect reward for innovation. In sectors like pharmaceuticals, where monopoly distortions seem particularly severe, there is growing international political pressure to identify alternatives to patents that could lower prices. Innovation prizes and other non-patent...

In this paper we develop a theory of how factors interact at the plant level. The theory has implications for: (1) the micro foundations for capital skill complementarity (2) the relationship between factor allocation and plant size and (3) the effects of trade and growth on the skill premium....

It may be advantageous to provide a variety of kinds of patent protection to heterogenous innovations. Innovations which benefit society largely through their use as building blocks to future inventions may require a different scope of protection in order to be encouraged. We model the problem...

This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation in which firms are heterogeneous in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the ideas and their subsequent development effort are private information. Monopoly power is a scarce resource to be allocated...

This paper studies the design of unemployment insurance when neither the searching effort nor the savings of an unemployed agent can be monitored. If the principal could monitor the savings, the optimal policy would leave the agent savings-constrained. With a constant absolute risk-aversion...