We characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are...

An observer of a process View the MathML source believes the process is governed by Q whereas the true law is P. We bound the expected average distance between P(xt|x1,…,xt−1) and Q(xt|x1,…,xt−1) for t=1,…,n by a function of the relative entropy between the marginals of P and Q on the...

This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...

In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs...

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk...