We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully internalize the shared knowledge. When spillovers are local and transit through the network of alliances, stable architectures with a moderate level of asymmetry are identified.

We consider a multimarket framework where a set of firms compete on two interrelated oligopolistic markets. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can spy on others in order to increase the quality of their product. We characterize the equilibrium espionage networks and networks that...

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully internalize the shared knowledge. When spillovers are local and transit through the network of alliances, stable architectures with a moderate level of asymmetry are identified.

We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three...

We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707) model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A...

We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer anda retailer. We find that only three...

We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability and efficiency of R&D collaboration networks in an oligopolistic industry with three firms. Whenever firms settle wages, the complete network is always pairwise stable and the partially...

We reconsider Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [Rand J. of Econ. 32 (2001), 686-707] model of strategic networks in order to analyze how government policies (e.g. subsidies) will affect the stability and efficiency of networks of R&D collaboration among three firms located in different countries. A...