We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known … quantity decision. We characterize the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the … uninformed buyers. We then compare the signaling Cournot equilibrium with the full-information Cournot equilibrium. Signaling is …

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known … quantity decision. We characterize the unique signaling Cournot equilibrium in which the price signals quality to the … uninformed buyers. We then compare the signaling Cournot equilibrium with the full-information Cournot equilibrium. Signaling is …

conveys full information about the quality of the good to uninformed buyers. Deceiving the uninformed buyers by charging a … high price and mimicking a high quality is not profitable when the competitive fringe is large enough. Since a higher price … effect of asymmetric information and learning on the equilibrium outcomes. More uninformed buyers increases the price …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the … equilibrium. We first study the behavior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality. We then show the effect of …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the … equilibrium. We first study the behavior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality. We then show the effect of …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …