We consider the relationship between a traditional competitive market and a competitive market with middlemen for trading indivisible commodities. We demonstrate that existence of many homogeneous middlemen leads to a change from the market with middlemen to the bilateral market.

We propose a job matching model of intermediary labor markets by developing the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford. Using this model, we show that for an arbitrary fixed broker-fee rate, the salary-adjustment process converges to a core allocation in intermediary labor markets where high-skilled...

First, we investigate which type of the liability law that protects nuclear power plants against catastrophe is socially optimal. We show that when a firm with a few funds is managed under the strict liability, maximization of social welfare is impossible since the firm may not cope with the...

We propose a job matching model of intermediary labor markets by developing the seminal work of Kelso and Crawford (1982, Econometrica 50:1483-1504). Using this model, we show that there exists a brokerage-fee rate such that a modified salary-adjustment process yields a core allocation in which...

This study provides sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core of a market for indivisible commodities with middlemen. This market is formulated as a three-sided assignment game without sidepayments. Our conditions are characterized by special properties of three-sided assignment games...

This paper considers welfare allocation rules when cities far from a river basin share water resources. The underlying situation is that the cities share a pipe from the water source and they are willing to distribute the welfare produced by using water. I propose two welfare allocation rule:...

Rings of collusive bidders at an English auction frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of knockouts. This paper presents a model of sequences of knockouts. I investigate the relationship between the distributive outcome of each sequence and each solution of...