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military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806304
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010239068
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499788
, unique stable matching is obtained through a procedure that resembles a serial dictatorship. Thus, acyclicity generalizes the …This paper analyzes the role of acyclicity in singleton cores. We show that the absence of simultaneous cycles is a … sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Furthermore, acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291577
We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategy-proof rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005063227
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099969
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189122
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435707
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227
Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … structure and (cooperative) solution concepts. The main structural condition is an acyclicity notion that rules out the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270419