credentialism. The model overcomes an important criticism of signalling models by mechanically tying a worker’s wages to their …-augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with coworkers. A worker’s credentials allow them to demonstrate their investment to …

. Our results have potentially important implications for the design of markets based on strategy-proof matching algorithms. …

Taking as a starting point the theory of matching applied in the case of a problem of college admissions, where one is … students and colleges, in order to achieve the best possible matching that is stable, strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and fair. …

market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a …

Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling …-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same "typical" known preferences … responsive to some worker's signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches …

market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a …

Several labor markets, including the job market for new Ph.D. economists, have recently developed formal signaling …-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same “typical” known preferences … responsive to some workerʼs signal, the introduction of signaling strictly decreases the expected number of matches. …

Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the signaling for interviews in the job … market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate the effect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a … signaling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also …