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Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when...
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We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We characterize the efficient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ priorities. When priority orderings are not strict, it is not possible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005729693
We consider discontinuous games with incomplete information. Auctions are a leading example. With standard tie breaking rules (or more generally, sharing rules), these games may not have equilibria. We consider sharing rules that depend on the private information of players. We show that there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005482062
We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We characterize the efficient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ priorities. When priority orderings are not strict, it is not possible to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008617044
Ties in customer facility choice may occur when the customer selects the facility with maximum utility to be served. In the location literature ties in maximum utility are broken by assigning a fixed proportion of the customer demand to the facilities with maximum utility which are owned by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190634