A large theoretical literature shows that competition reduces banks' franchise values and induces them to take more risk. Recent research contradicts this result: When banks charge lower rates, their borrowers have an incentive to choose safer investments, so they will in turn be safer. However,...

We consider a model of financial intermediation with a monopolistic competition market structure. A non-monotonic relationship between the risk measured as a probability of default and the degree of competition is established.

We consider a model of financial intermediation with a monopolistic competition market structure. A non-monotonic relationship between the risk measured as a probability of default and the degree of competition is established.

The effect bank competition has on interest rates should depend on the fact that borrowers compete against each other. The borrowing rate of a firm affects its ability to compete in the industrial marketplace, and ultimately, its ability to repay its loans. Thus, competition amongst borrowers...

We analyse the implications for the pricing of bank loans of the reform of capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains...

We use tools from survival analysis to study the equilibrium probability of bank failure in a model with imperfect correlation in loan defaults where a systematic risk factor and idiosyncratic frailty factors govern borrower credit worth. We derive several surprising results: in equilibrium, a...

This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....

A model of loan rate competition with liquidity provision by banks is used to study bank mergers. Both loan rate competition and liquidity needs are seen to be "localised" phenomena. This allows for tracing down the effects of particular types of bank mergers. As such, we contrast the effects of...

A model of loan rate competition with liquidity provision by banks is used to study bank mergers. Both loan rate competition and liquidity needs are seen to be "localised" phenomena. This allows for tracing down the effects of particular types of bank mergers. As such, we contrast the effects of...

A model of loan rate competition with liquidity provision by banks is used to study bank mergers. Both loan rate competition and liquidity needs are seen to be "localised" phenomena. This allows for tracing down the effects of particular types of bank mergers. As such, we contrast the effects of...