criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism substantially facilitates collusion. It increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic …), favoritism only partially shades the cartel from the environment. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at …

criteria. A first result is that, in a one-shot context, favoritism turns the asymmetric information (private cost) procurement … favoritism increases the gains from collusion and contributes to solving basic implementation problems for a cartel of bidders … favoritism greatly simplifies matters for the cartel. We thus find that favoritism generally facilitates collusion at a high cost …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of …