Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award … a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. …

Public procurement contracts (PPCs) of goods, services and works is about one tenth of global gross domestic product …