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Thöni, Christian; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Wengström, Erik - 2010

We show that the standard trust question routinely used in social capital research is importantly related to cooperation behavior and we provide evidence on the microfoundation of this relation. We run a large-scale public goods experiment over the internet in Denmark using a design that enables...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011310730

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Finus, Michael - 2004

Standard non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) draw a pessimistic picture of the prospective of successful cooperation: only small coalitions are stable that achieve only little. However, there also exist IEAs with higher participation and more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324941

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Finus, Michael; van Ierland, Ekko; Dellink, Rob - 2003

We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325097

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca - 2003

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325099

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Finus, Michael; Eyckmans, Johan - 2003

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325122

Tipping versus cooperating to supply a public good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - 2015

In some important multi-player situations, such as efforts to supply a global public good, players can choose the game they want to play. In this paper we conduct an experimental test of the decision to choose between a "tipping" game, in which every player wants to contribute to the public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348229

Procrastination and projects

Külpmann, Philipp - 2015

In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348266

When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner's dilemma as a game of multiple motives

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2013

Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner's dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323844

Social motives in intergroup conflict

Weisel, Ori; Zultan, Ro'i - 2013

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the … framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by … to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323881

Investment and adaptation as commitment devices in climate politics

Heuson, Clemens; Peters, Wolfgang; Schwarze, Reimund; … - 2013

It is well established that adaptation and technological investment in each case may serve as a commitment device in international climate politics. This paper for the first time analyzes the combined impact of these two strategic variables on global mitigation within a noncooperative framework...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324131