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output decisions can be jointly characterized as strategies within a game. A Nash-Cournot equilibrium of the game provides a … analogous to "baseload" capacity and "peaking" capacity in wholesale electricity markets. The Nash-Cournot benchmark constituted … a good indicator of subjects' output decisions in that output cycled around the Cournot benchmark. Thus, on average …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012056279
In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence.Theory predicts simultaneous production in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091156
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014467868
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487322
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295651
We investigate the role tacit collusion plays in Asymmetric Price Transmission (APT), the tendency of prices to respond more rapidly to positive than to negative cost shocks. Using a laboratory experiment that isolates the effects of tacit collusion, we observe APT pricing behavior in markets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438281
Competition between oligopolist electricity generators is inhibited by transmission constraints. I present a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of an electricity market with a single lossless, but constrained, transmission line. The market admits equilibria in which generator withhold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011917084
Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011917085
Competition between oligopolist electricity generators is inhibited by transmission constraints. I present a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of an electricity market with a single lossless, but constrained, transmission line. The market admits equilibria in which generator withhold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824800
Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011824801