This paper studies advertising in vertically differentiated product markets with positive consumption externalities. In markets with consumption externalities, the value of the product to the consumer depends on the purchasing decisions of other consumers. In such markets, we show that firms...

I compare the outcome when firms semicollude on advertising to the outcome in the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model of informative advertising. I show that advertising is lower but prices and profits are higher under semicollusion on advertising. I also show that semicollusion on advertising is...

In this paper, we build a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with horizontal product differentiation and advertising externality between firms. We investigate the effects of regulating misinformation on market competition, behavior of firms, and social welfare. We...

Traditional models of consumer choice assume consumers are aware of all products for sale. This assumption is questionable, especially when applied to markets characterized by a high degree of change, such as the personal computer (PC) industry. I present an empirical discrete-choice model of...

There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze...

This paper analyzes persuasive advertising and pricing in oligopoly if firms sell differentiated products and consumers have heterogeneous social attitudes towards the consumption by others. Deriving product demand from primitives, we show that the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive...

This paper analyzes persuasive advertising and pricing in oligopoly if firms sell differentiated products and consumers have heterogeneous social attitudes towards the consumption by others. Deriving product demand from primitives, we show that the demand-enhancing effect of persuasive...

Consumer information on products affects competition and profits. We analyze firms' decisions to impart product information through advertising: comparative advertising also allows them to impart information about rivals' products. If firms sell products of similar qualities, both want to...

Improved consumer information about (symmetric) products can lead to better matching but also higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough firm asymmetry though, the stronger firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers....

Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher-quality (and hence larger) firm's price...