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AbstractThe following sections are included:ExcessThe NucleolusUniquenessCharacterizing the CoreThe Intermediate Case and Proper GamesExtended CoreSuperior GamesThe Example of a Common-Property ResourceThe Example of a CartelSummary and Conclusions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206539
AbstractThe following sections are included:Bargaining Power GamesExamplesThe Relation of this Model to Some PredecessorsMatching Games and Bargaining PowerBargaining Power NTU Games in Partition Function FormReflectionsSummary
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206552
AbstractThe following sections are included:Shapley's “Algorithm”Maskin's ProposalAn Extended Shapley AlgorithmSome ExamplesAn Illustrative ExampleA Game with Strong Positive ExternalitiesA Game with Mild Positive ExternalitiesA Game that is not SuperadditiveThe Enigma GameAn Exceptional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206612
AbstractThe following sections are included:A Primer for Cooperative Games in Extensive FormFurther ExamplesAn Example with Demographic ChangeA More General DiscussionChapter Summary and Conclusions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206629
AbstractThe following sections are included:Superadditive Games in Coalition Function FormThe CoreShapley ValueThe NucleolusA Comparative PerspectiveChapter Summary
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206750
general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the …) an efficient profile can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core; and (iii) any achievable profile can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686703
outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is always nonempty when the game has strategic … complementarities. We apply this result to cartel formation in Bertrand oligopoly and in Shapley-Shubik (1977) strategic market games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608773
introduce the corresponding TU-games. The core, as well as the two friendly solutions for the corners of the market, in this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011322
We prove that for any coalitional game the core coincides with the bargaining set à la Davis and Maschler when we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278755
Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique … are balanced via a related assignment game. By using certain core elements of infinite transportation games it can be … shown that infinite pooling games have a non-empty core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081026