The traditional indicators on innovation rely on the linear assumption that research leads to development, centring on the measurement of inputs and outputs. Based on the traditional innovation indicators, recent studies focused on the industrial innovation process at Latin America state that...

In settings where the Revelation Principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision-making, and at best achieve the same level of performance.This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of...

We study the investment incentives of a regulated, incumbent firm in a deregulation process. The regulator cannot commit to a long-term regulatory policy, and investment decisions are taken before optimal regulatory policies are imposed. We characterize the regulated incumbent's incentive to...

The paper introduces first the legal framework as it has been developed by French jurisprudence which distinguishes the social interest of the firm from the interest of all stakeholders. Then, it presents the monitoring of executives in several fields, commodity markets, the financial market,...

This paper replaces the conventional view of the firm as a nexus of contracts with a strategic approach based on the theory of repeated games, where input contributions and side payments are self-enforcing.

Network density, membership fees and service are analytically related to factors such as the size of the target population, the distribution of ability to enjoy the networl's service within target population, the tax-regbate on membership payment, the service production costs, which are...

Worlwide, evidence is increasing that privatization improves firm performance. But in some institutionally-weak transition economies, ownership change has so far not delivered on its promise. Why? Mass and rapid privatization shcmes turned over mediocre assets to people lacking the incentives,...

The paper introduces an abstract economy with imperfect competition; the choice of allocation takes place through an abstract mechanism, when produceres choose strategies and the outcome is (a set of) feasible allocations, where the consumers' choices are sustained by the market mechanism at...

In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Drèze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there...