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Send, Jonas - 2021

I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not oﬀer membership in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323852

The Effect of the Number of Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation

Sun, Guang-Zhen; Ng, Yew-Kwang - 2008

groups. The first model analyzes the case in which individuals in each group ignore the effect of the lobbying effect on the … model examine the case wherein the individual in each group takes account of the effect of lobbying activities on the Big …-size" effect in lobbying; when the group number is big, the Big Pie effect is insignificant and therefore is dominated by the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014170948

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014205871

Private-Information Group Contests

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - 2015

We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142038

The Effect of Number and Size of Interest Groups on Social Rent Dissipation

Sun, Guang-Zhen - 2001

models are developed to investigate the social welfare implication of the number and size of the lobbying interest groups …. The first addresses social rent dissipation of lobbying activities where individuals in each lobbying group ignore the … lobbying effect on the size of aggregate output of the economy. It is shown that social rent dissipation is lower the larger is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058328

How to avoid transferring a valuable asset

Bucovetsky, Sam; Glazer, Amihai - In: Public choice 138 (2009) 1/2, pp. 3-8

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003789514

The politics of randomness

Epstein, Gil S.; Nitsan, Shemuʾel - In: Social choice and welfare 27 (2006) 2, pp. 423-433

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003383767

Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 79 (2015) 1, pp. 133-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485378

Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions

Szech, Nora - In: Games and economic behavior 92 (2015), pp. 138-149

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011385977

Politicians, governed vs. non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation

Epstein, Gil S.; Mealem, Yosef - 2013

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010209696