We recover valuations of time using detailed data from a large ride-hail platform, where drivers bid on trips and consumers choose between a set of rides with different prices and waiting times. We estimate demand as a function of prices and waiting times and find that price elasticities are...

We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive relation- ship between delegation of decisions within organizations and involvement in research and development. This positive correlation is robust to controlling for the determi- nants of R&D within firms such as the...

We study a specific model of competing manufacturer-retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with non-market externalities at the downstream level. In this simple framework we show that a “laissez- faire" approach towards vertical price control might harm consumers...

This paper points out that vertical delegation, implemented through the design of quantity discount contracts, may allow upstream producers, as well as downstream retailers, to achieve profits higher than those obtained under vertical integration or contracts based on price restrictions. Our...

I examine a model of a uniform price auction of a perfectly divisible good with private information in which the bidders submit discrete bidpoints rather than continuous downward sloping demand functions. I characterize necessary conditions for equilibrium bidding. The characterization reveals a...

We develop a test for common values in auctions in which some bidders possess information about rivals’ bids. This information causes a bidder to bid differently when she has a private value than when her value depends on rivals’ information. In a divisible good setting, such as treasury...

In this paper we study European banks’ demand for short-term funds during the 2007 subprime market crisis. We use bidding data from the European Central Bank’s auctions for one-week loans. Through a model of bidding, we show that bank behavior reflects the cost of obtaining short-term funds...

Several important auction settings, including treasury auctions in Canada and the U.S., have the feature that some bidders (dealers) observe the bids of a subset of other bidders (customers). Quantifying the economic advantage that informationally advantaged bidders derive from this...