We analyze 582 R&D agreements between Air Force agencies and outside partners. Agencies choose partners and contractual terms consistent with predictions from a rational model, which suggests that they could be incentive efficient from an ex ante perspective

We analyze 582 R&D agreements between Air Force agencies and outside partners. Agenices choose partners and contractual terms consistent with predictions from a rational model, which suggests that they could be incentive efficient from an ex ante perspective.

We examine the financing choices of undiversified owner-managers in a continuous-time model. Managers' financing choices as well as their dynamic equity stakes, which trade off their private benefits and the costs they incur due to their lack of diversification, are simultaneously and...

We develop a model to show how agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, information processing and learning about project quality, manager synergies and bargaining power interact to affect a firm's internal organizational structure and the incentive compensation structures of its...

We develop a model to show how agency conflicts, free rider effects and monitoring costs interact to affect optimal team size and workers' incentive contracts. Team size increases with project risk, decreases with profitability, and decreases with monitoring costs as a proportion of output. Our...

We examine the financing choices of undiversified owner-managers in a continuous-time model. Managers' financing choices as well as their dynamic equity stakes, which trade off their private benefits and the costs they incur due to their lack of diversification, are simultaneously and...