We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely...

In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection...

Social demand functions result from the budget constrained maximization of “social preferences” or “other regarding preferences.” These preferences are non-selfishin the sense that they also depend on other consumers’ wealth. This paper addresse sthe robustness to wealth externalities...

The Heckscher-Ohlin model with arbitrary number of goods, factors and countries (consumers) and no restrictions on factor trading is shown to be equivalent to an exchange model whose goods are the productive factors while consumer’s indirect demands for factors are derived from their actual...

Popular press and some practitioners have warned against threats that buying risky assets pose on agents saving for retirement, children education and other uses. This paper shows that in a standard two-period general equilibrium model where some saver shave no risk-sharing motives, there exists...

We consider a connection networks model. Every agent has a demand in the form of pairs of locations she wants connected, and a willingness to pay for connectivity. A planner aims at implementing a welfare maximizing network and allocating the resulting cost, but information is asymmetric: agents...

We consider a generalization of the Minimum Cost Spanning Tree (MCST) model dubbed the Minimum Cost Connection Network (MCCN) model, where network users have connection demands in the form of a pair of target nodes they want connected directly, or indirectly. Given a network which satisfies all...

This paper studies corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. At the market equilibrium, shareholders typically disagree on the way to evaluate production plans outside the market span. Hence a collective decision mechanism is needed to resolve this conflict. A...