In cooperative games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in his group or to exit and act as...

A notion of cognitive uncertainty is introduced as an agent's uncertainty about the validity of the results of his own information processing. In order to analyze this notion, a formal model of the agent's information processing is presented. It is shown how cognitive uncertainty may prevent a...

A geometric approach, analogous to the approach used in the additive case, is proposed to determine the conditional expectation with non- additive probabilities. The conditional expectation is then applied for (i) updating the probability when new information becomes available; and (ii) defining...

This paper studies the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. The paper identifies stable outcomes under population learning dynamics in which individuals with some probability replace...

This paper establishes the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions for Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games. An equilibrium in a Sender-Receiver cheap-talk game is said to be in reduced form if every message is used by at least one type and no two messages provoke the same response....

We present a model of categorization based on prototypes. A prototype is an image or template of an idealized member of the category. Once a set of prototypes is defined, entities are sorted into categories on the basis of the prototypes they are closest to. We provide a characterization of...

A valuation for a board game is an assignment of numeric values to different states of the board. The valuation reflects the desirability of the states for the player. It can be used by a player to decide on her next move during the play. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the...

Laboratory experiments concerning decision under uncertainty tend to uncover systematic violations of Bayesian rationality. When models that posit Bayesian rationality are compared to non-experimental data, though, they fit the data well. One possible explanation is that an agent's global...

A likelihood order is defined over linear subspaces of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. It is shown that such an order that satisfies some plausible axioms can be represented by a quantum probability in two cases: pure state and uniform measure.

This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played...