Similar Search Results

Judge's Gate-Keeping Power and Deterrence of Negligent Acts : An Economic Analysis of Twombly and Iqbal

Kim, Chulyoung - 2018

Following its landmark decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court allows federal judges to dismiss cases when the plaintiff's allegations are conclusory or implausible, thereby increasing the judges' discretionary power in pleading stages of litigation. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936277

Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

Kim, Chulyoung - 2018

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the litigant is willing to consult an expert even when the judge is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936278

Financially-Constrained Lawyers : An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes

Landeo, Claudia M. - 2018

Financial constraints reduce the lawyer's ability to file lawsuits and bring cases to trial. As a result, access to justice for victims, pretrial bargaining, and potential injurers' precaution might be affected. We study civil litigation using a model that allows for asymmetric information,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012937165

An Empirical Analysis of Litigation with Discovery

van Boening, Mark - 2017

We conduct an experimental analysis of discovery in both the signaling and screening games, where in both games an … in the screening game, but not in the signaling game. In the later part of the screening game, discovery is invoked in 73 … theory. In the signaling game we find, contra the theory, that discovery is invoked about 61% percent of the time, and this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012968586

Judicial Decision Making : A Dynamic Reputation Approach

Cohen, Alma - 2017

We seek to contribute to an understanding of how judicial elections affect the incentives and decisions of judges. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that judges who are concerned about their reputation would tend to "decide against their prior" as they approach elections. That is, judges...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972177

Sinking Costs to Force or Deter Settlement

Hubbard, William H. J. - 2017

This paper develops a simple but general model of negative-expected-value (NEV) suit and settlement given symmetric information. Plaintiffs and defendants can choose when and to what extent they sink litigation costs through the use of retainers and detailed pleading. I demonstrate sharp...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012973073

Costly Voluntary Disclosure with Negative Expected Value Suits

Farmer, Amy - 2016

A standard result in the litigation literature is that the informed party will not make a costly voluntary disclosure in a screening game. We develop a screening game in which an uninformed plaintiff makes an offer to an informed defendant. Under the American rule for the allocation of trial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013002592

Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts

Emons, Winand - 2016

Victims want to collect damages from injurers. Cases differ with respect to the judgment. Attorneys observe the expected judgment, clients do not. Victims need an attorney to sue; defense attorneys reduce the probability that the plaintiff prevails. Plaintiffs' attorneys offer contingent fees...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006109

Differences in Conservatism between Big Eight and Non-Big Eight Auditors

Basu, Sudipta - 2016

Auditors' incentives to be conservative are likely to vary both cross-sectionally and over time based on their legal liability exposure. We predict that Big Eight (Six/Five) auditors are likely to be more conservative than non-Big Eight Auditors. We show that the earnings reported by Big Eight...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006502

Bayesian Manipulation of Litigation Outcomes

Guerra-Pujol, F. E. - 2016

In our previous work (Guerra-Pujol, 2011), we presented a general Bayesian model of the litigation process and concluded that "regardless of the operative rules of procedure and substantive legal doctrine, litigation outcomes [are] a highly reliable indicator of a defendant's [actual] guilt." By...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006510