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Franchising is nowadays a prominent way to organize the distribution sector. While previous literature suggests that … monitoring issues are a critical determinant of organizational choices, it is rather silent on the optimal monitoring strategy … once the organization of the chain is set. In this article, we analyze the monitoring policy of chains with both franchised …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010780363
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Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
loans. This practice has an adverse effect on commercial banks' monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342362
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
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Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855287
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521