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We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771308
may contain members who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger … corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes can help deter capture …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011617407
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011659325
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884978
computations, the likelihood of two paradoxes of committee elections, the Leaving Member paradox (Staring, 1986) and of the Prior … Successor Paradox which occur when an elected candidate steps down from a two-member committee. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934680
An adaptation of the Kemeny rule (Kemeny 1959) was proposed by Ratliff (2003) for committees elections. A Committee is … a fixed-size subset of candidates. Ratliff (2003) showed that the elected committee under the rule he proposed is not …, the elected committee of two candidates is always made of the two top candidates of the Kemeny ranking. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278737
highlighting the flaws of the 1988 Accord, an evaluation is made of the Basel Committee’s efforts to address such weaknesses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260315
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370984
This paper introduces information aggregation into the standard spatial committee game. We assume that committee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200583
We study the volatility of the policy chosen by a committee whose members have volatile preferences. It is smaller than … if it was chosen by a single member, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller the volatility of members …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005211990