This paper examines the competition between money and credit in a search model with divisible commodities. It is shown that flat money can be valuable even though it yields a lower rate of return than the coexisting credit. The competition between money and credit increases efficiency. The...

This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the...

We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired...

We are given a bipartite graph G = (A B;E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference list of any b B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such...

We study a natural generalization of the maximum weight many-to-one matching problem. We are given an undirected bipartite graph G = (A P, E) with weights on the edges in E, and with lower and upper quotas on the vertices in P.We seek a maximum weight many-to-one matching satisfying two sets of...

Given a bipartite graph G=(A B, E) with strict preference lists and given an edge e E, we ask if there exists a popular matching in G that contains e. We call this the popular edge problem. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M' such that the vertices that prefer M' to M outnumber...

We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists (SRI) that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, egal d-SRI, involves finding an egalitarian stable matching in solvable...

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this set-up, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive...

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...

This paper offers a theoretical model which focuses on cultural bargaining behavior. It is based on an intercultural negotiation framework of activity-based cultural types (Ott, 2011). The complexities of international negotiations are analyzed from a multi-active bargaining perspective which...