Industrial Dispute was disturbing the economic, social and political life of a country. A strike in a public utility …, sanitation and defense will disorganizes public life. The workers loose the wages for the strike period. It results in a huge …

´s willingness to participate in a strike. We develop and compare two signaling models of strikes: in one, firms are able to monitor …

A strike insurance is integrated into a model based on one-sided private information of the firm. It is shown that the … strike insurance will increase the dispute level if payments to the insurance are lump-sum or if payments from the insurance … dispute, strike activity will fall. Information on the extent of employer strike funds and union strike pay in 16 OECD …

unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage … strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a …

of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured. …

The consequences of strike pay for employees and of an employers' strike insurance fund are analysed in a two …-period screening model of labour disputes with private information of the firm. It is shown that the employers' strike fund reduces … uncertainty and hence lowers strike activity. If the union's strike pay fund can incur a deficit during disputes, strike pay will …

unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage … strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a …

In this paper we outline the economic rationale behind the virtual strike, and workers’ incentives to use this … bargaining solution rather than resorting to standard strike action. We show that, from a welfare perspective, a virtual strike … always dominates a standard strike and it would be most needed precisely when workers have weaker incentives to adopt it. We …