We analyze the incentives for a controlling shareholder to acquire silent or controlling shares in a competitor. When it occurs, the acquisition is detrimental to minority shareholders of his firm, or to the target, or even to both. The ownership structure of firms turns out to be a key...

[eng] Collusion deterrence and efficiency of two regimes of fines. . Within a Principal Agent Model, we characterize the optimal policy of an agency in charge of competition policy. We consider a situation of asymmetric information concerning the cost of production between the agency and the...

In this article, we analyze the characteristics of legal thresholds crossings in France during the years 2001 through 2003. Our data set created using the publications of the financial authorities and economic and financial data from Bloomberg comprises a total of 2.396 operations and displays a...

We analyze horizontal mergers in vertically related industries. In a successive Cournot oligopoly model, we first compare the profitability of mergers in the upstream and in the downstream sectors. We characterize conditions on the concavities of the input supply function and the final demand...

Cet article propose une analyse économique comparative de différentes règles de droit utilisées en cas de rupture de contrat. Il met plus particulièrement l'accent sur trois critères: la rupture efficace du contrat, l'existence d'investissement spécifique dans la relation contractuelle et...

Cet article s'intéresse aux concentrations horizontales dans des marchés reliés verticalement. Dans un modèle de concurrence à la Cournot à deux niveaux, où les transactions se font par l'intermédiaire d'un marché, on montre que des fusions horizontales engendrant des effets de taille...

Cet article explore les effets des concentrations horizontales dans des marchés reliés verticalement. Dans un modèle de concurrence imparfaite à deux niveaux, où les transactions verticales se font par l'intermédiaire d'un marché, on montre que des fusions horizontales engendrant des...

We analyze the incentives of a controlling shareholder of a firm to acquire, directly or indirectly through his firm, shares in a competitor. We charaterize the conditions under which these partial acquisitions as well as the equilibrium toehold and its nature: controlling or silent. We find...

The aim of this article is to convince that economic tools are useful and relevant to analyze antitrust policy. More precisely, we show that the economics of antitrust enforcement provides a helpful framework to address fundamental practical questions : How to efficiently enforce antitrust...